Occupying the Ideological Conservative Left: A closer look into the BSW

In this blog, the political, and especially the electoral arena is seen through the lenses of an economist, as a market, where there is an ideological demand and an offer that corresponds – or not – to the what the public requires.

As most people - even those uninterested in politics - will know, generally what we define as right and left wing, is delineated as follows: right wingers are fiscally liberal – nominally favour lower rates of taxation and are opposed to a large intervening “nanny-state”, whilst remaining sceptical towards what is deemed as social “progression”, in the historicist meaning of the word; on the other hand, left-wing parties are socialist and collectivist in the economic sphere, whilst being promoters of societal changes, given that traditional norms and structures are perceived as  institutionally of the right and serving the “oppressor” class.

Being “far-right/left”, merely implies pushing these stances to their logical conclusion and moving away from the consensus of the “centre” which has governed the West from the end of the Cold War, up until roughly 2016 and remains strongly positioned to the day of the writing of this article.

Surprisingly, there is little interest in has been – for lack of a better term – dubbed in this article as “conservative left”, namely a political offer which is left-wing economically, therefore in favour of social welfare and a constructive state that intervenes actively in the economic sphere, for the purposes of redistribution and support of those who are considered less fortunate, whilst being nationalistic, sceptical of  radical social changes and championing values historically associated with the right, such as tradition, religion and authority.

I say this is surprising, given that from the earliest systemic analysis of public opinion there is a clear indication that large segments of the public, on a base or instinctual level subscribe to such an ideological stance and would therefore be prone to support electoral subjects that promote such a worldview. To illustrate this point, I can refer to Seymour Martin Lipset – an authority on public opinion formation – and his seminal work, “Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics” (1960), throughout which as he was examining the attitudes amongst voters, noted that a large segment of the working class, supported left-wing economic reforms – as is to be expected – however, expressed hard-right social views, most notably resisting progressive ideas about the family structure, supporting a punitive, rather than a rehabilitating justice system and even showing admiration for the practices of fascist dictators. The author explains this ideological convergence, as a product of social insecurity and cultural dynamics. The phenomenon was named “working-class authoritarianism” by Lipset, but throughout the rest of his research he clearly indicates that such “irregular” modes of thinking were present in other social strata.

In another classic study, conducted by Eric Hoffer, entitled “The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements” (1951), the author delves into the psychological and sociological factors which push a large segment of the public to rally themselves around movements that promise economic security, coupled with cultural unity.

Therefore, it is evident that the electoral “market”, had a “consumer” base for a product that was genuinely rare, beyond fringe electoral subjects who marketed themselves too far outside the Overton Window on the authoritarian right, therefore could not capture the mood of this electorate. One explanation as to why this ideological space was not occupied by successful political entrepreneurs could be the fact that material and historical conditions were impeding such an undertaking to flourish. Increasing productivity, rising living standards and the Cold War dictated the dominance of the two-party system, and the ideological nature of the dichotomy that was described in the opening paragraphs.

Alas, these conditions apply no longer. The political West is being outcompeted in economic production, living standards are falling drastically and an array of socio-political conditions have made large segments of the public re-assess their political allegiances and re-position themselves in the ideological spectrum.

Thus, a political movement that capitalized on this vacuum and provides the “par excellence” example for our analysis is the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance – Reason and Justice (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht – Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit, BSW), a party founded only a few months before in the beginning of this year. The first thing that is evident is the presence of the name of the leader in the party’s title, thus re-enforcing what was stated in the first article of this blog that one of the elements of the “winning formula” for new political parties is to have a leader that has an established political career that can be marketed effectively to the public. This combination of the novice with the familiar, is highly effective in the post-2008 party system.

The party is a break-away from “Die Linke”, the left-wing party, which was electorally viable in the East of Germany, being perceived as a “soft” descendant of the socialist regime of in the D.R.G and was supported by people nostalgic of the system. However, in the latter years it had shifted much more to the progressive side of the social equation, embracing environmentalism, the doctrine of open borders and generally bought on the whole package of policies, where it could not possibly compete, given that the original purveyors of such ideals, the Greens had picked all the fruits of that tree. This made way for the AfD, albeit right-wing and quite libertarian economically to increase its support in the East of Germany – to the point of becoming the first party in several regions and the overall first party amongst the youth and men in the East – merely due to its social rhetoric and anti-migration stance.

Extracting many others from Die Linke, such as Amira Mohamed Ali, Christian Leye etc., Wagenknecht positioned the new party as a left-wing, populist alternative, advocating socialist policies, combined with a critical view of the green agenda, Euroscepticism, anti-migration and social conservatism. For any thinking observer of politics, this ideological “cocktail” was bound to succeed.

However, what makes this political subject even more exciting in the eyes of the Political Behaviourist is the novice and unique intra-party structure. The BSW literally created a layered referral membership system, similar to luxury brands, or pyramid schemes – you choose whichever one you prefer as an example. The vision is to have a small and intentionally limited membership base. The party distinguishes between full members and registered supporters. Applicants for membership must be vouched for by an existing member and every single application must be approved by the party’s Federal Executive Board. In the beginning, the party membership was capped at 450, however due to the large volume of applications and referrals, it has been increased to allow 2000 full memberships by 2025. This was justified by Wagenknecht as necessary to ensure that only believers in the cause can be part of the decision-making bodies of the party, and no one can obstruct the strategic vision implemented in its formation.

Having witnessed the subversion of many new political formations by entryism and their transformation into something unrecognisable to what they were in the beginning (notably the “5 Star Movement” in Italy), from a practical point of view this strategy is highly commendable. Additionally, imagine the motivation of the rare few that are admitted to be full-time members to campaign for the party, to contribute and to be active.  

In the first five months of existence, the party secured approximately 6% of the national vote in Germany for the European Elections, performing particularly well in eastern German States and condemning Die Linke, extracting votes from the ruling SPD, and according to meta-analyses conducted the AfD. The timing of the creation of the party is indicative of the electoral expertise at the helm of the party. It is a well-established that European Elections are a more fertile ground for new political subjects, given that voters do not perceive them as crucial, view them as a vehicle to send political messages without much consequence – therefore, there is a significant increase in the protest vote – and the centrist electorate is likely to participate less and engage less in campaigning.

In subsequent months, in state elections in the eastern regions of Saxony, Thuringia, and Branderburg, the BSW garnered 11-16% of the vote, possibly being the kingmaker in some of these states. The appeal to disaffected voters was recorded immediately by Reuters. It is remarkable how a 10-month old party beat most of the established brands in German politics. 

The story of the leader of the party, is almost as provoking as that of the political subject itself. Sahra Wagenknecht was born in East Germany, from an Iranian father and a mother that worked in the state-run art distributor in East Berlin. She joined the Socialist Unity Party in early 1989, a time-period when one assumes that most young people would be looking away from left-wing politics in Eastern Germany. She studied philosophy and modern German literature at universities in Jena and Berlin, but did not complete her thesis, due to a lack of support for her research – is that not the fate of most interesting people in contemporary academia??... I digress – however she did manage to earn a PhD in economics in 2012, having led the Communist Platform within the Die Linke throughout the late 2000s. Most notably, she was vice-chair of the Parliamentary Group from 2015 to 2019, period throughout the party was drifting away from the concerns of its traditional electoral base, towards more “trendy” ideologies.

One can speculate that this relatively long experience with the structures of Die Linke, positioned her in a favourable position to be able to extract functionaries and people with local influence, which can be an additional explanatory factor for the very fast electoral success of the party.

As re-iterated above, the blog does not intent in making normative assessments’ whatsoever. The “good” in the eye of the entrepreneur is what brings more capital, which in this case is votes. Whether this ideological stance is “right” or “wrong” is a matter of discussion in philosophy forums and undoubtedly it is a crucial and fruitful discussion to be had. The point that ought to be conveyed clearly in this case is that as theoretically framed, there is indeed an electoral pull for such a blend of politics, and other political entrepreneurs ought to exploit the existing vacuum in a lot of countries.

In another example of the success of this formula, is evident in France where the first party currently, although known in the punditry parlance as “far-right”, is anything but when it comes to its economic platform that can be more appropriately described as “welfare chauvinistic”. The “nanny state” is preferable as long as it serves nationals, rather than foreigners. Michel Barnier’s government fell due to not being able to comply with the National Rally’s high spending demands. For both the BSW and the RN, poll trends show them on the rise.

In future blogs, other non-orthodox political "cocktails" will be analysed to judge them, for their electoral viability, but this ought to have been the first, given that it is more established in the literature as a viable alternative and the electoral results support the thesis.